In a previous question I asked whether the Theravada posits the selflessness of phenomena?
Where the best answer I understood to essentially state that it does not. At least, it did sound like there was an important difference between the selflessness of persons and the selflessness of phenomena. That is, Theravada regards the self of persons as not truly existent while the self of phenomena may or may not be. Further, the latter is not deemed an important question. This is not in agreement with the Mahayana madhyamaka schools AFAIK who I think near uniformly disagree.
In my opinion, the Theravada view according to the Pali suttas imply that:
The self (of persons) is not truly existent.
Whether non-self phenomena are truly existent from its own side or not, is (probably) not important towards the path to the end of suffering. (See the Parable of the Poisoned Arrow, Parable of the Simsapa Leaves and the Discourse on the Unconjecturables)
However, in a comment to this recent answer it was asserted by the same that 'papanca' of objects is essentially equivalent to what the Mahayana schools call the selflessness of persons. I'm confused as this seems to be in tension with the previous. What is the solution or is it just my misunderstanding?
Is there any crucial difference between the emptiness of persons and emptiness of objects where the former is to be regarded as definitely non-truly existent while the latter question is not important? Is there some Pali suttas which will illustrate this difference in emptiness between the two selves? Is the 'papanca' of the self of persons different from the 'papanca' of the self of phenomena? What am I missing?
Isn't it the case that SN 22.95 is talking about this 'papanca' of phenomena? Doesn't it compare it to an illusion? If so, then on what basis is it concluded that whether phenomena are truly existent is immaterial in Theravada?