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I'm energetically trying to uproot the view of self, meaning, the sense that there is a subject of experience.

I have read/heard authors such as Sam Harris and Joseph Goldstein say that the self as a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."

Sam Harris, Page 92

The self that does not survive scrutiny is the subject of experience in each present moment— the feeling of being a thinker of thoughts inside one’s head, the sense of being an owner or inhabitant of a physical body, which this false self seems to appropriate as a kind of vehicle.

And yet, however one looks for it, this self is nowhere to be found. It cannot be seen amid the particulars of experience, and it cannot be seen when experience itself is viewed as a totality. However, its absence can be found— and when it is, the feeling of being a self disappears.

Josteph Goldstein, No-Self (17:00)

 

Losing the self is not necessary, you don’t have to get rid of the self because it is not there in the first place.

Is it be more accurate to say that the self as a feeling that there is a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."?

Since, when an object is known, how do you deny there being someone who has done the knowing of the object?

I'm energetically trying to uproot the view of self, meaning, the sense that there is a subject of experience.

I have read/heard authors such as Sam Harris and Joseph Goldstein say that the self as a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."

Sam Harris, Page 92

The self that does not survive scrutiny is the subject of experience in each present moment— the feeling of being a thinker of thoughts inside one’s head, the sense of being an owner or inhabitant of a physical body, which this false self seems to appropriate as a kind of vehicle.

And yet, however one looks for it, this self is nowhere to be found. It cannot be seen amid the particulars of experience, and it cannot be seen when experience itself is viewed as a totality. However, its absence can be found— and when it is, the feeling of being a self disappears.

Josteph Goldstein, No-Self (17:00)

 

Losing the self is not necessary, you don’t have to get rid of the self because it is not there in the first place.

Is it be more accurate to say that the self as a feeling that there is a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."?

Since, when an object is known, how do you deny there being someone who has done the knowing of the object?

I'm energetically trying to uproot the view of self, meaning, the sense that there is a subject of experience.

I have read/heard authors such as Sam Harris and Joseph Goldstein say that the self as a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."

Sam Harris, Page 92

The self that does not survive scrutiny is the subject of experience in each present moment— the feeling of being a thinker of thoughts inside one’s head, the sense of being an owner or inhabitant of a physical body, which this false self seems to appropriate as a kind of vehicle.

And yet, however one looks for it, this self is nowhere to be found. It cannot be seen amid the particulars of experience, and it cannot be seen when experience itself is viewed as a totality. However, its absence can be found— and when it is, the feeling of being a self disappears.

Josteph Goldstein, No-Self (17:00)

Losing the self is not necessary, you don’t have to get rid of the self because it is not there in the first place.

Is it be more accurate to say that the self as a feeling that there is a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."?

Since, when an object is known, how do you deny there being someone who has done the knowing of the object?

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user8619
user8619

Seeing there is no subject experiencing subject and object?

I'm energetically trying to uproot the view of self, meaning, the sense that there is a subject of experience.

I have read/heard authors such as Sam Harris and Joseph Goldstein say that the self as a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."

Sam Harris, Page 92

The self that does not survive scrutiny is the subject of experience in each present moment— the feeling of being a thinker of thoughts inside one’s head, the sense of being an owner or inhabitant of a physical body, which this false self seems to appropriate as a kind of vehicle.

And yet, however one looks for it, this self is nowhere to be found. It cannot be seen amid the particulars of experience, and it cannot be seen when experience itself is viewed as a totality. However, its absence can be found— and when it is, the feeling of being a self disappears.

Josteph Goldstein, No-Self (17:00)

Losing the self is not necessary, you don’t have to get rid of the self because it is not there in the first place.

Is it be more accurate to say that the self as a feeling that there is a subject of experience "cannot be found" or "is not there in the first place."?

Since, when an object is known, how do you deny there being someone who has done the knowing of the object?