Adi Shankara refuted the Buddhist realistic school in his commentary of Brahma Sutra.
There are realistic as well as idealistic schools in Buddhism. All things are aggregates, according to Buddhism; there is nothing like substantiality. For the realistic schools, there are two kinds of aggregates, the internal and the external. But, consistent with the other Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, how aggregation can take place at all passes one's understanding. There is a processor of successive moments; but how are the moments related? What connection is there between what precedes and what succeeds? These questions remain unsolved. For the Buddhist idealist, there is no extra-mental reality; ideas are things; what is real is a series of momentary ideas. This view is also untenable. The appearance of ideas is sought to be explained as brought about by residual impression. But, how can there be residual impression, if there are no external things. So says Badarayana, the Buddhist view is totally unintelligible (Sarvatha-anupapattih: Brahma Sutra II.II.32).
Have any Buddhist philosophers responded to this, and debunked it?