So I've been Reading a bit of the Buddhist's boogeyman Shankara and I admit I am maybe biased in writing this(I am open to any refutation of my view,but I have not seen any adequate logical refutation of such),but I'd like to see a buddhist refutation or answer of this following viewpoint of mine based on a reading of Shankara's writings:
the temporary momentary alaya vijnana in yogachara buddhism is the substratum of momentary impressions,desires and ideas wich give rise to the false perception of external objects in their system.ideas and impressions(vasana samskaras)give rise to the appearance of external objects,wich give rise to further ideas and impressions wich give rise to further objects of external perception.however how can this not be a infinite regress(the appearance of external objects give rise to impressions,impressions give rise to the appearance external objects)?if external objects' (even just initial in some starting point in the past,wich buddhism denies due to its adherance to pratityasamutpada)existance is altogether denied to possibly exist rather than the mere appearance of them,how can impressions and desires come about for such objects ''appearance''?
and if there is no permanent substratum to the mind wherein impressions and desires can leave a mark or effect,how can anything be cognized externally(i.e how can vasana samskaras be configured or accumulated(with out wich it cant exist)without a permanent substratum?
such latent impressions cannot exist in a fresh new substratum (i.e person )each moment,because neither desire would arise from the appearance of external objects nor the appearance of external objects from impressions' desire(and the Yogacarin must admit a certain illogical infinite regress even in the case of a assumed permanent substratum)?
a new subtratum cannot have any impressions nor appearance of external objects to give impressions because the substratum,in this case the Alaya vijnana has no connection with its 'causal' substratum due to kshanabhanga. if there were no permanent substratum there would literally be no experience or consciousness it seems based on the above.
only if a permanent substratum exists can such infinite regress of impression arising the appearance of external objects and vice versa even have any meaning(and even that is illogical as actual regressive infinites do not exist logically but I know that buddhism believes in infinite regression so I'm Granting you this.but such infinite regress would only 'make sence'within a permanent substratum).
I don't See how the Buddhist Doctrine of alayavijnana does not fail,and how only a permanent self can explain the infinite regress of ideas leading to (the appearance of) external objects and vice versa(wich itself is illogical in my opinion,but I am granting you guys' this for the sake of argument only).
if Kshanabhanga(wich is a Buddhist Tenet fundamental to buddhism) is Denied here,as some may Wish to do,and the substratums have a causal chain wich must be substantial;then how is this not a Permanent Self of the tirthikas for all intents and purposes?
buddhism denies this,and all of buddhism except Jonang would all fail if this were admitted,but if this were the case we have a permanent cognizing substantial 'self'/'person' through all the 3 times.
I don't see how the momentary alayavijnana is not a failure.