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Dear friends, looking for parallels between the practice of Tonglen, and the Husserlian notion of Intersubjectivity, I have come upon this research paper by Natalie Depraz, Phd. Quoting from the abstract :

It is well-known that Husserl’s analysis of intersubjectivity is primarily based on empathy. Now, such an experience of empathy is described in Husserl as involving the peculiar spatiality of our lived body, a temporal pairing of both lived bodies and a specific imaginative transfer of one’s psychic states into those of the other. I would like to confront such a multilayered experience of the other with the way some Buddhist teachings (which first appeared in India and were then transmitted to Tibet) present the experience of compassion within what is called the Mahayana tradition. Indeed, the “tonglen” praxis (as Tibetans call it), which is described very concretely in such a framework, echoes in many ways the Husserlian empathetic experience as far as the bodily rooting, the synchronizing timing are concerned and above all as far as the way imagination is taken into account. By comparing both praxis and analysis with regard to lived space, time and imagination, we will be able to evaluate their affinities, their differences and finally how they may enlight and even generate each other.

I would welcome with the utmost gratitude your enlightening comments, and reference to relevant material.

Thank you for having taken the time and effort to read this.

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Refer to SN 55.7, which discusses each moral precept against killing, stealing, adultery & wrong speech.

Here, householders, a noble disciple reflects thus: ‘I am one who wishes to live, who does not wish to die; I desire happiness and am averse to suffering. Since I am one who wishes to live, who does not wish to die; who desires happiness and is averse to suffering; if someone were to take my life, that would not be pleasing and agreeable to me. Now if I were to take the life of another – of one who wishes to live, who does not wish to die, who desires happiness and is averse to suffering–that would not be pleasing and agreeable to the other either. What is displeasing and disagreeable to me is displeasing and disagreeable to the other too. How can I inflict upon another what is displeasing and disagreeable to me?’ Having reflected thus, he himself abstains from the destruction of life, exhorts others to abstain from the destruction of life, and speaks in praise of abstinence from the destruction of life. Thus this bodily conduct of his is purified in three respects.

SN 55.7

Also, refer to Dhammapada X:

129. All tremble at violence; all fear death. Putting oneself in the place of another, one should not kill nor cause another to kill.

130. All tremble at violence; life is dear to all. Putting oneself in the place of another, one should not kill nor cause another to kill.

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